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Abstract
The uprisings that led to regime change during the early period of the Arab Spring were initially inclusive and pluralistic
in nature, with men and women from every political and religious orientation engaging actively in political activities on
the street and in virtual spaces. While there was an opening of political space for women and the inclusion of demands of
marginalized groups in the activists’ agenda, the struggle to reimagine national identities that balance Islamic roots and
secular yearnings is still ongoing in many countries in the region. This paper seeks to deepen understanding of the extent
to which the pluralistic sentiments and openness to accepting the rights women have persisted following the uprising.
We aim to examine changes in attitudes towards women’s equality in countries that underwent regime change through
popular uprisings during revolutionary upheavals of the Arab Spring and in countries where regimes have remained un-
changed. Using available data from consecutive rounds of the Arab Barometer survey, we examine changes in attitudes in
nine countries with two rounds of Arab Barometer during and post Arab Spring (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon,
Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine).We find that support for “Muslim feminism” (an interpretation of gender equality grounded
in Islam) has increased over the period and particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for “secular feminism” has
declined. In most countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality co-exist with a preference for
Islamic interpretations of personal status codes1 pertaining to women. We discuss the implications of these findings for
academics and activists concerned with women’s rights in the Middle East North Africa (MENA).
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1. Introduction
For many Western observers, Islamism, and more
broadly governance based on Islamic principles (or any
theocratic principles for that matter) is viewed as in-
herently antagonistic to democracy and women’s rights.
Theocracies are deemed antagonistic to democratic rule,
since, rather than giving power to the people to gov-
ern themselves, power is granted to self-appointed sur-
rogates of the divine who dictate their own interpreta-
tions. Based on this notion, the working assumption has
been that to support women’s rights, countries must
be secular. Muslim-majority countries like Tunisia and
Lebanon that have historically chosen the secular path
1 Personal status codes are the legal codes that govern family matters including marriage, divorce and child custody.
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are viewed as more supportive of women’s rights, for in-
stance, through more liberal interpretations of personal
status codes regulating marriage and divorce. By con-
trast, Islamic interpretations of personal status codes
(not unlike other monotheistic religions) is generally
viewed as antagonistic to women’s rights. This view is
supported by the fact that countries living under an Is-
lamic theocracy, e.g., Iran, Afghanistan under the Tal-
iban, Algeria under the Islamic Salvation Front, have seen
sharp curtailments in women’s rights, including dictating
the veiling of women and enforcing conservative inter-
pretations of personal status codes.
Political scientists have also viewed the separation
of church/mosque and state as necessary for democ-
racy (Hashemi, 2009; Robinson, 1997). Realist foreign
policy has backed Western friendly secular dictators un-
der the premise that true democratic competition in pre-
dominately Muslim countries would undoubtedly culmi-
nate in “one-person, one-vote, one-time” (Blaydes & Lo,
2011; Hurd, 2008; Neep, 2004). In other words, true
democratic competition would lead to the election of
anti-democratic Islamist parties, unfriendly to the West
that would also curtail political pluralism. Advocates for
secularism in the region have pointed out that foster-
ing peace, security and social justice and combating sec-
tarian conflicts in religiously pluralistic communities de-
mand secular governance.
An alternative view posits that Islam is not inherently
antagonistic to women’s rights or democracy, but rather
that those Islamist movements that seek to counter
a Western model of modernity and throw off colonial
chains have advanced a return to ‘purer’ forms of Is-
lamic observance. Veiling, sexual segregation and conser-
vative interpretations of personal status codes governing
marriage and divorce serve as key symbols of such a re-
turn. Moreover, theocracy, or religiously-based author-
itarianism serves as an oppositional vision to Western
liberal democracy. In this way, political Islam has been
poised as a means of achieving a distinctly non-Western
form of governance steeped in religious traditionalism.
Women and men in the Muslim world have increasingly
embraced a return to traditional conservative Islamic val-
ues and behaviors that had been thrown off by their par-
ents and grandparents, and have seen it as a reclaiming
of authentic identities (Hilsdon & Rozario, 2006). In this
view, to embraceWestern rhetoric about women’s rights
is to subjugate the mind to mental colonization, or to
serve as agents of Western imperialism.
While initially secularism was viewed as the path
to achieving gender equality, its association with the
West andWestern styles of government that generates a
sharp division between Church/Mosque and state have
become viewed as an imperialist notion and secular-
ism identified with secular-authoritarian regimes. Three
dominant schools of thought represent feminist dis-
course in the region. Islamist and Reformist feminists sug-
gest that Islam and women’s rights need not be viewed
as oppositional. They both ground their interpretations
of women’s rights in Islam and advocate for changes in
the current interpretation of women’s position in Islam.
The first school advanced by Islamist feminists looks at
earlyMuslim societies that embraced an egalitarian form
of Islam, and argues that a return to fundamentals will
guarantee women’s rights. The second school of thought
advanced by Reformist Feminists calls for reforms to
keep up with the pace of progress in women’s position.
They argue that the concept of “Ijtihad”—independent
reasoning and the employment of one’s mental faculty
in solving legal questions—means that the position of
women (among other issues) was not meant to be static
but flexible and open to modification across societies
and time. (e.g., Mir-Hosseini, 2011). Secular feminists
on the other hand, have advocated for a separation
of mosque/church and state and for interpretation of
women’s rights that are not grounded in any religious
ideology, but are based on equal rights and obligations
of women and men as citizens of the state (Mir-Hosseini,
2006; Moghadam, 2002).
The events culminating in the Arab Spring have con-
tinued to complicate the simple dichotomies between
secularism and theocracy and women’s rights and West-
ernization. In several post-transition countries, moder-
ate Islamist parties consistent with democracy and pre-
senting interpretation of women’s rights consistent with
Islam are emerging, raising questions about the simple
opposition frequently asserted between women’s rights
and Islam and between Islam and democracy (Boduszyn-
ski, Fabbe, & Lamont, 2015; Kurzman & Turkoglu, 2015;
Netterstrom, 2015). Moreover, the uprisings initially ap-
peared secular and inclusive in nature, with women
having engaged actively in political activities in physi-
cal and virtual spaces, alongside their male compatri-
ots (Abu-Lughod & Ferguson, 2014; Retta, 2013; Satter-
field, 2013).2 During the uprising, protesters with diverse
political leanings were united against authoritarianism,
but without a clear or shared vision of what the post-
revolutionary societywould look like. Therewas an open-
ing of political space for women and the inclusion of de-
mands of all marginalized groups in the activists’ agenda.
Islamists, secularists and modernists for a brief moment
came together and collectively accepted a unified vision
of a transition to a society that is more democratic.
It is unclear what the impact of the uprisings has been
on women’s rights. Has the Arab Spring created an oppor-
tunity to break down false dichotomies and build democ-
racies with pluralistic religious parties and women’s rights
grounded in a progressive interpretation of Islam?Or does
the same Western/modern versus Islamist/traditionalist
logic continue to govern attitudes on women’s rights in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)?
2 The creation of political spaces for women during political uprisings is not a new phenomenon. Contrary to popular belief, women of all social classes
have for decades been active participants in political movements, in trade unions, political opposition parties, informal networks and human rights
movements and organizations in the region. Women have been active bloggers and activists in virtual spaces for many years (Al-Ali, 2012).
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To analyze these questions, we examine the degree
to which citizens of countries that underwent recent
regime change have altered their views on women’s sta-
tus compared with countries without regime change.
We examine the degree to which lack of support of
theocratic systems, a sense of political empowerment
and having favorable views of Western societies predict
more open attitudes toward women’s rights. We addi-
tionally examine differences in attitudes between the
sexes. Do women and men hold similar views regard-
ing women’s status adjusting for support for secularism
and religiosity? Are women being held back by men or
by their own making as has been suggested by some
observers of women’s embrace of Islamist ideologies3
(Rozario, 2006)?
2. Women’s Rights in the MENA
While some researchers suggest that the cultural fault
line that separates the West and the Muslim world is
about gender equality and sexual liberalization more so
than democracy and that the apparent dearth of gen-
der equality makes democracy unsustainable in predom-
inately Muslim societies (Inglehart & Norris, 2003), oth-
ers maintain that women’s rights are caught in the cross-
hairs of deeper political battles (Al-Ali, 2012; Cohen &
Enloe, 2003). What constitutes “women’s rights” and
whose conception of women’s rights should apply re-
mains a contentious issue and battles over these defini-
tions reveal how power is constructed in authoritarian
regimes, how inequalities are produced and reproduced
in public and private spaces, and how the State recon-
structs to maintain control of its population.
In much of theMENA personal status codes, deriving
from Shari’a (Islamic law), governs the institution of the
family and certain aspects of women’s social and legal
status. Personal status codes embody the symbolic rep-
resentation of the “woman question” in the Middle East,
or the problematic position of women in the modern
state (Charrad, 2001; Hatem, 1994). As Charrad (2001)
explains, “in the Maghreb, as in other parts of the Is-
lamic world, women’s rights as defined in family law are
the crux of the matter. They are experienced as fun-
damental, as is reflected in the use of the expression
‘women’s rights’ in the Maghrib to refer to family law”
(2001, p. 5). In this respect, personal status codes repre-
sent the archetypal women’s rights issue in the MENA,
and it is around these codes that the struggle over the
fraught “woman question” is frequently fought in the re-
gion (Hatem, 1994).
The promulgation of personal status codes and the
impact they have on women’s position has been an area
of great contention in Muslim-majority countries, par-
ticularly from the vantage point of Islamist movements
(Hatem, 1994). The interpretation of the Shari’a and how
women’s status is operationalized in these documents
can have a profound impact on the status of women, ei-
ther as a source of greater equality if “liberally” inter-
preted, or a source of restriction on women’s full citi-
zenship rights if “conservatively” interpreted (Ziai, 1997).
Yet, studies of how instances of political liberalization
in the MENA impact on women’s status have received
limited scholarly attention (e.g., Brand, 1997). What the
public thinks of these codes has received even less at-
tention. A recent Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
poll of Muslims in 39 countries found tremendous varia-
tion in attitudes on women’s rights, which varied largely
along regional lines (Pew Center on Religion in Public
Life, 2013). The MENA region, according to the study,
is the most conservative regarding gender equality com-
pared with Muslim-majority countries in other parts of
the world.
Apart from personal status codes, the issue of
women’s dress has taken on particular significance in the
Muslim world. Initially embracing more modern dress
post-colonialism and throwing off the veil, in the post-
independence period, women in the MENA began in-
creasingly adopting more modest forms of dress in-
cluding the more restrictive burqua, which has diffused
across the Muslim world and is being adopted in places
where this practice is not traditional (Rozario, 2006). Full
body covering and face coveringwas a traditional custom
only in parts of the Middle East including Saudi Arabia,
but not in North Africa. Head covering has also begun
to be adopted in places where this was not previously
the norm.
This raises questions about how to understand and
interpret the diffusion of these “invented traditions”
(Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983). Should the choice to veil or
gender segregate be seen as a form of empowerment, or
as a repressive social norm? Does it represent women’s
internalization of their own subjugated status, or is it an
expression of their independence as a modern, but non-
Western authentic woman? Is it a political statement,
and if so, what is the statement? Should laws banning
veiling be seen as anti-democratic and contrary to reli-
gious liberty and freedom of expression just as laws re-
quiring veiling are seen as repressive to women? Femi-
nist scholarship has underscored the tension this creates
for Muslim women who find themselves torn between
their culture/religion on the one hand and their desire
for more equality with men on the other hand (Winter,
2006). However, insofar as women’s equality is painted
as representative of Western individual rights, women
are forced to choose between their group rights and their
individual rights (Winter, 2006).
With these tensions in mind, we examine the degree
to which recent attitudes in the MENA region reflect 1)
the “secular-feminist” camp that views women’s rights
as achievable only through the separation of state and
religion; 2) the “Islamist-reformist feminist” camp that
views women’s rights as consistent with and only achiev-
3 We recognize the variations in Islamist construction of gender ideologies. For example, Al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the
Salafis in Egypt represent a wide spectrum from embracing women’s rights to a rigid and regressive conceptualization of women’s position.
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able by the favorable interpretation of religious texts. To
what extent can we distinguish support for these differ-
ent types of feminisms in popular public opinion in the
region? How do support for these different interpreta-
tions of women’s rights vary across countries and over
the time period of the Arab Spring?
3. Methods
Data Source. With a dearth of systematic and rigorous
empirical research on public opinion in the Arab world,
far too little is known about the nature, distribution,
and determinants of the political orientations of ordi-
nary citizens in the MENA. This study uses data from
Waves 2 and 3 of the Arab Barometer Surveys. Data
for Waves 2 and 3 surveys was collected using face-to-
face interviews, with households selected using a multi-
stage area probability sampling approach. Male and fe-
male respondents eighteen years of age or older were
selected from within households. In-country partners,
for the most part based at universities, research cen-
ters, nongovernmental or private sector organizations,
carried out the data collection process. We used data
from all countries that had completed two rounds of
Arab Barometer surveys (Waves 2 and 3). These included
three Arab Spring countries (Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen),
and six non-Arab Spring countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan).
Although ideally we would have liked to capture the
change in attitudes before the political uprisings that led
to regime change and after regime change, the timing
of Wave 2 surveys only allowed for examination of the
period during the political upheavals in Arab Spring and
comparison countries and about 2 years subsequently.
Wave 2 of the Arab Barometer was collected during
2010/2011 and Wave 3 during 2013, over the period di-
rectly following the Arab Spring uprisings. In fact, the po-
litical uprisings themselves was what permitted the con-
duct of surveys that in the past had been prohibited in
Egypt and Tunisia. Table 1 (appendix) summarizes the
sample sizes and dates of data collection in each coun-
try in the sample.
3.1. Dependent Variable(s)
The goal of this research was to determine how attitudes
towards women’s rights and the interpretation of reli-
gious codes relating to women’s status have changed
over the period of Arab awakening in countries that
experienced and did not experience political uprisings.
Did the uprisings lead to greater support for women’s
rights, or a more radicalized, strict religious interpre-
tation of women’s status? Did other countries in the
region that did not experience political change experi-
ence changes in attitudes towards women’s status? How
do Muslim-majority countries vary in their attitudes to-
wards women’s rights and support for a secular versus
religious interpretations of women’s status?
We were particularly interested in what might be
termed “Muslim feminism” or the simultaneous support
for women’s equality, but a rejection of a purely secu-
lar interpretation of gender roles and relations. In other
words, Muslim feminists aremen and womenwho reject
the notion that the only means of supporting women’s
rights is through state sponsored secularism.
Support for Muslim Feminism.4 Our primary depen-
dent variable is, therefore, a composite measure of sup-
port for gender equality and support for a strict or re-
formed reading of Islamic law as it pertains to women’s
status. This measure represents the interaction of indi-
viduals consistently holding beliefs in gender equality,
but also advocating for a legal system that is based on in-
terpretation of religious texts as they pertain to women’s
status. Belowwe describe how support for gender equal-
ity and support for a strict or reformed interpretation of
religious doctrines scales were derived.
Support for Secular Interpretation of Women’s Rights
(Secular Feminism). Four questions that appear in both
Wave 2 and Wave 3 of the Arab Barometer Survey cap-
ture the degree to which respondents endorse a strict
or reformed interpretation of Islamic law or advocate for
secular legal codes related to women’s status in terms
of women’s inheritance rights, the rules regulating mar-
riage and divorce, gender segregation in education and
rules regulating women’s dress (i.e., enforcing the hijab).
4 There were major limitations in the question wordings for gender-related questions that impede inferences that can be drawn about support for differ-
ent visions of how to achieve women’s rights and gender equality that are worth noting. A number of the questions were double-barreled or awkwardly
worded and did not provide enough nuance to identify different categories of feminists or supporters of women’s rights. For instance, the question
about requiring women to wear the hijab was phrased as “women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear a hijab”. Disagreeing with
this statement is ambiguous as it might mean that the respondent believes that women should be required to wear a hijab or that the respondent
disagrees that women should wear modest clothes. Moreover, the statement that “the government and parliament should enact inheritance laws in
accordance with Islamic law” and “personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law” provides too little nuance about what this
would actually mean. For example, in some instances, a strict interpretation of Islamic law, which at least guarantees that women inherit half of their
husband’s assets, may be more generous to women than a law that says that women should get nothing. For most countries in theMENA, the question
is not whether Islamic personal status laws should be applied, but how they should be interpreted—liberally to confer more rights and greater gender
equality or conservatively, constraining women’s rights sometimes even more than a “strict” reading of Sharia law would dictate. Applying Islamic as
opposed to customary law may in some cases provide more protections to women’s status. The differences across countries in how these status codes
have historically been interpreted is wide (Charrad, 1997). Likewise, the questions regarding gender equitable attitudes were somewhat flawed. The
question asking to what extent respondents agree that “women canwork outside the home,” could be interpreted asmore of a factual statement about
whether women in that country in fact do work outside the home rather than an opinion statement (i.e., “women should be allowed to work outside
the home unimpeded”). These limitations in question wording meant that the measure of “Muslim feminism” generated in this analysis may be too
blunt an indicator to distinguish between those that endorse the more moderate “modernist” interpretation of Islam and those that might support a
more radicalized political interpretation of Islam, or Islamists.
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The questions are asked as follows:
A. The government and parliament should enact in-
heritance laws in accordance with Islamic law;
B. The government and parliament should enact per-
sonal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance
with Islamic law;
C. Gender-mixed education should be allowed in uni-
versities;
D. Women should wear modest clothes without
needing to wear a hijab.
Individuals who indicated strong disagreement/disagree-
ment with statements A and B and strong agree-
ment/agreement with statements C and D were coded
(2), and identified as Secular Feminists. Individuals
who expressed strong agreement/agreement with state-
ments A and B and strong disagreement/disagreement
with statements C and Dwere coded (0) and identified as
Islamist. Individuals who somewhat agreed or somewhat
disagreedwith the statements were coded (1) and identi-
fied as Reformists. To develop the Muslim feminist inter-
action, Individuals with consistently Islamist viewpoints
on women’s status on three out of four questions were
coded as 1 to combine with gender equality measures
described below.
Gender Equality Norms. Respondents were asked
their degree of agreement/disagreement with the fol-
lowing statements on a 4 point scale:
A. Women can work outside the home;
B. Men are better political leaders than women;
C. University education is more important for men
than women.
The three measures were dichotomized and summed
to produce three categories of respondents—those with
consistently gender equitable responses are those who
strongly agreed/agreed with statement A and strongly
disagreed/disagreedwith B and C (thesewere coded [2]).
Individuals with mixed responses did not consistently
endorse the more gender equitable responses (these
were coded [1]). Individuals with consistently gender in-
equitable responses are those who strong disagreed/dis-
agreed with statement A and strongly agreed/agreed
with statements B and C (these were coded [0]).
Muslim Feminism (Islamist and Reformist). Those
with consistently gender equitable responses were in-
teracted with individuals that consistently reported sup-
porting an Islamic interpretation of women’s status on
three out of four questions to generate a measure of
Muslim feminism. Those supporting Muslim feminism
in the sample therefore represent individuals who both
consistently endorse the application of Islamic law to
women’s status but also consistently endorse norms of
gender equality. This measure is intended to capture in-
dividuals endorsing the Islamist and reformist schools
of thought pertaining to women’s rights in the region—
individuals that believe that women’s rights can and
should be justified and grounded in religious interpreta-
tions of the Quran.
Each of these dependent variables (support for secu-
lar feminism, gender equality andMuslim feminism) was
analyzed separately adjusting for covariates described
below.
3.2. Independent Variables
Citizens’ views of women’s status are likely affected by
their overarching political orientations as well as demo-
graphic characteristics. We adjust for several variables af-
fecting individual attitudes towards women’s status.
Support for Political Secularism. We analyze indi-
viduals’ support for a politically secular versus theo-
cratic regime using three variables: 1) support for Theoc-
racy “a system governed by Islamic law without elec-
tions or political parties” (% believe this is very appro-
priate/appropriate); 2) support for secular democracy
“Support for a parliamentary system in which only non-
religious parties compete in parliamentary elections” (%
very appropriate/appropriate); 3) support for a pluralis-
tic system “support for a parliamentary system where
nationalist, left wing, right wing and Islamist parties
compete in elections” (% very appropriate/appropriate).
Each was treated as a separate dichotomous variable.
Support for Legal Secularism. We also included ques-
tions about support for a separation between legal codes
and religious codes as this is likely to affect support
for a secular interpretation of women’s status. We used
the following question to measure legal secularism: The
government and parliament should enact laws in accor-
dance with Islam (% disagree strongly/disagree). We hy-
pothesized that those who were antagonistic towards
secularism generally would be more hostile towards sec-
ularism in regards to women’s rights.
Anti-Westernism. Individuals that have particularly
negative views towards the United States or Western
powers may reject women’s rights or secular interpreta-
tions of women’s status, which they view as represent-
ing Western enlightenment values. We include two mea-
sures of anti-Westernism: 1) % that agree/agree strongly
with the statement “foreign interference is an obstacle
to reform in your country”; and 2) % that agree/agree
strongly with the statement “the United States’ interfer-
ence in the region justifies armed operations against the
United States everywhere”.
Religiosity and Religion. Individuals with a greater
degree of religiosity should be less likely to hold secu-
lar viewpoints and may view gender equality as inimical
to religious observance. We adjust for religiosity using
three questionsmeasuring individuals that report always
praying daily, attending Friday (or Sunday) Prayer and al-
ways/most of the time reading the Quran. Though the
majority of the individuals from each country areMuslim
(94% of the total sample), we also adjust for theminority
of respondents that are non-Muslim.
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Gender. We anticipate women being more likely to
support women’s equality and a more progressive in-
terpretation of religious scriptures on women’s status.
However, we also recognize that women often inter-
nalize inequitable gender attitudes and may also reject
secularism as the basis for protecting and advancing
women’s rights. We therefore adjust for the gender of re-
spondents.We also compute gender disaggregated point
estimates for the each of the questions pertaining to
women’s rights and gender equality variables over the
time period.
Age. As older individualsmay havemore “traditional”
beliefs about gender roles and norms, or conversely, the
younger generation may have less tolerance for secular-
ism, we adjust for the age of respondents using three cat-
egories (18–34, 35–54, 55+).
Marital Status. Married individuals may have differ-
ent views on personal status codes and gender norms
than unmarried individuals. We code individuals as cur-
rently married or currently single (bachelor, divorced,
widowed, engaged).
Treatment of Missing Variables. Overall rates of miss-
ing data were quite low. No single variable had more
the 8% values missing or with individuals reporting don’t
know/refused. For values that were missing, we used
multiple imputation to assign values.
3.3. Analysis
We first calculated the point estimates for each of the
major dependent variables (attitudes towards women’s
equality, women’s personal status) for each country at
Wave 2 and 3 overall and disaggregated by gender. To cal-
culate point estimates representative of the population,
we applied sampling weights to the data and calculated
confidence intervals. This allows for visual inspection of
the overall change in attitudes across countries over the
time period, disaggregated by question and gender.
Multivariate models were run as ordered logistic
regression models for the measures of secular femi-
nism and support for gender equality and logistic re-
gression to examine predictors of Muslim feminism.
The study employed a difference-in-difference approach
comparing change in the dependent variables between
Waves and between Arab Spring countries and non-Arab
Spring countries adjusting for covariates. To examine the
change between periods, in ourmodels, we included sur-
vey Wave as an independent variable, and as an inter-
action term with Arab Spring and non-Arab Spring coun-
tries. If the interaction terms are significant, this shows
that the change in outcomes in Arab Spring countries
between the two time points is significantly different
from the change in outcomes in non-Arab Spring coun-
tries. We also included country and Wave fixed effects
to account for stable differences across countries be-
tween Waves.
All analysis was run using Stata version 13 using or-
dered logistic regression for secular feminismand gender
equity scales (xtologit command) and logistic regression
for models with Islamic feminism as the outcome (xtlogit
command). Results from the ordered logistic regressions
are presented as odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients)
with confidence intervals for greater interpretability.
Overall, our hypotheses are that:
1) Arab Spring countries will see a larger change in at-
titudes over time than non-Arab Spring countries
due to their political upheavals;
2) Arab Spring countrieswill see declining support for
secular interpretations of women’s rights and in-
creasing support for Muslim feminism;
3) Countries with a history of secularism pertaining
to women’s status will exhibit higher support for
secularism.
4. Results
Weighted point estimates: Support for women’s rights
and gender equality disaggregated across countries,
Waves and gender. Results from the weighted point es-
timates were summarized in tables 2 and 3. The results
show wide variation across countries in support for vari-
ous aspects of women’s rights and gender equality.
Overarching trends. Inmost countries an overwhelm-
ing majority agreed that personal status laws covering
marriage and divorce and inheritance laws should be
in accordance with Islamic law (Table 2). The two ex-
ceptions to this trend were the historically most secu-
lar countries—Lebanon and Tunisia—where a minority
and a lesser plurality respectively agreed that women’s
status codes should be interpreted in accordance with
Islamic law. However, bucking this trend, a majority of
Tunisians believed that inheritance laws should be inter-
preted in accordancewith Islamic law. In addition to their
higher support for secularism, Most countries were di-
vided over whether women should be required to wear
the hijab with Lebanon, Tunisia and Sudan most strongly
opposing this requirement. Countries were also divided
over whether university education should be co-ed with
Lebanon and Tunisia showing the strongest support for
mixed education over time.
Gender norms were also somewhat contradictory
(Table 3).While largemajorities in all countries disagreed
with the idea that university education is more impor-
tant for men than women and believed that women can
work outside the home, in all countries except Lebanon
a majority believed that men are better political leaders
than women.
Disaggregated by gender. Female respondents in
most countries held attitudes slightly more favorable to-
wards women compared with their male compatriots,
but not bymuch, and differences in attitudes were larger
across countries than between the sexeswithin the same
country. Overall, the disagreement between the sexes
was much larger on matters of gender equality than the
interpretation of women’s status codes in relation to Is-
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lamic laws. Men and women in the same countries were
mainly in agreement (within 5% points of each other)
on the issues of interpreting women’s marriage/divorce,
inheritance rights, whether they should be required to
wear the hijab and whether university education should
be co-ed. Therewasmuchmore disagreement over ques-
tions of gender equality withwomen in each country hav-
ingmore gender egalitarian norms; i.e., beingmore likely
than men to believe that women can work outside the
home, less likely to believe that men make better politi-
cal leaders, and less likely to believe that university edu-
cation is more important for men.
Disaggregated by Wave. Changes in point estimates
between Waves 2 and 3 (2011 and 2013) were most no-
table in Algeria and Egypt, but followed somewhat con-
tradictory and not consistent logics across countries. Al-
geria saw an increase in support for Islamic interpreta-
tions of personal status and inheritance laws, but also
saw a notable increase in gender equitable attitudes in-
cludingmore individuals reporting that hijabs should not
be required and that gender mixed education should be
allowed. By contrast, Egypt saw a decline in support for
strict Islamic interpretations of personal status and inher-
itance laws affecting women as well as decline in sup-
port for mandating hijabs. Egypt also increased in all cat-
egories of gender equitable attitudes except for seeing
declining support for gender mixed university education.
Tunisia saw large changes in gender equitable attitudes
with fewer people reporting that men are better politi-
cal leaders and that university education is more impor-
tant for women but only marginal changes in attitudes
towards the interpretation of personal status codes per-
taining to women.
Multivariate analysis. Table 4 (appendix) summarizes
each dependent and independent variable included in
the multivariate analysis across all countries. Table 5
(appendix) shows the results of the multivariate analy-
sis with all countries pooled for the three dependent
variables—support for secular feminism, support for gen-
der equality and support for Muslim feminism.
Table 4 shows that approximately 15% of the
pooled sample could be considered secular feminist
(consistent support for a non-Islamic interpretation of
laws/practices pertaining to women’s status), 25% con-
sistently supported gender equitable attitudes and 19%
represented Muslim feminists (those who endorse con-
sistently gender equitable beliefs, but also support Is-
lamic interpretations of laws and practices pertaining
to women).
Difference-in-Difference: Change in support for secu-
lar feminism, gender equality and Islamic feminism over
time between Arab-Spring and non-Arab Spring coun-
tries. Examining the interaction betweenWave and Arab
Spring countries in table 6, Arab Spring countries were
less supportive of secular feminism byWave 3 compared
withWave 2 but more supportive of gender equality and
Islamic feminism compared with non-Arab Spring coun-
tries. Specifically, opposite trends were observed in Arab
Spring and non-Arab Spring countries. Compared with
the pre-Arab Spring time period, non-Arab Spring coun-
tries increased their support for secular feminism, but
decreased their support for gender equality and Mus-
lim feminism.
Predictors of Support for Secular Feminism. Model 1
of Table 5 summarize predictors of support for secular
feminism (a preference for a secular interpretation of
personal status laws for women). Respondents that con-
sistently supported gender equality and hadmixed views
on the subject had higher odds of supporting secular fem-
inism (OR = 1.35, 1.55 p < 0.01). Respondents that en-
dorse theocracy in the political and legal spheres were
less likely to support secular feminism (OR .75, P < 0.01;
0.21, p < 0.01 respectively) whereas those who endorse
secularism in the political sphere were twice as likely to
support secular feminism (OR = 2.02, p < 0.01). More
religious individuals (individuals who reported praying
daily and attending Friday prayer weekly) were less likely
to endorse secular feminism (OR 0.85, 0.80 p < 0.01 re-
spectively). Most demographic characteristics were not
associated with support for secular feminism. Women
were not more likely than men to endorse secular in-
terpretations of women’s status codes, nor were indi-
viduals living in urban areas, those with higher educa-
tion or that were more economically secure. The one
demographic characteristic that was strongly associated
with support for secular feminismwas being non-Muslim.
Although only 6% of the sample reported that they
were non-Muslim, non-Muslimswere 9 timesmore likely
to support secular interpretations of women’s status
(OR = 9.33). Support for secular feminism fell in Wave 3
compared with Wave 2.
Predictors of Support for Gender Equality. Support for
equitable gender norms followed similar but also differ-
ent patterns than support for secular feminism (Model 2,
Table 5). Those who endorsed secular feminism also en-
dorsed greater norms of gender equality. They were less
likely to support theocracy but also less likely to support
secular democracy (OR 0.75, 0.81 p < 0.01 respectively)
and more likely to support a mixed political system that
allows both religious and secular parties to freely com-
pete. Those who regularly attend Friday prayer were less
likely to endorse gender equality but those who regu-
larly read the Koran were more likely to endorse gen-
der equitable attitudes (OR 0.88, 1.18 p < 0.01). While
women were not more likely to endorse secular inter-
pretations of women’s status, they were twice as likely
to endorse gender equitable attitudes. More educated
individuals but not those that were financially more se-
cure were more likely to endorse gender equitable atti-
tudes. Non-Muslims were more likely to endorse gender
equitable norms but not to the same extent as support-
ing secular interpretations of women’s status. Wave 3 re-
spondents were more likely to endorse equitable gender
norms compared with Wave 2.
Predictors of Support for Muslim Feminism. Model 3,
Table 5 summarize characteristics of support for Mus-
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lim feminism, or support for Islamic interpretations of
women’s status coupled with support for gender equity.
Individuals supportive of mixed political systems and an
Islamic interpretation of the law were more likely to sup-
portMuslim feminism (ORs= 1.22, 1.40 p< 0.01), but in-
dividuals supportive of theocracy and secular democracy
were less likely to endorse Muslim feminism (ORs = 0.83
0.89, p < 0.01). Those who think that foreign interfer-
ence is an obstacle to reform and those who always
attend Friday prayer were less likely to endorse Mus-
lim feminism (OR = 0.71, 0.85 p < 0.01). Women were
twice as likely as men to support Muslim feminism
and more educated individuals, whereas non-Muslims
were substantially less likely to supportMuslim feminism
(OR= 0.21, p< 0.01). ByWave 3 there was higher overall
support for Muslim feminism compared with Wave 2.
5. Discussion
Regional attitudes towards gender equality and secular-
ism. A primary goal of this study was to examine regional
attitudes in the MENA towards issues of gender equal-
ity and support for a secular interpretation of women’s
rights versus more reformist views that gender equality
can be achieved through a religiously based interpreta-
tion ofwomen’s rights. Attitudes towardswomen’s rights
and gender inequality has been understudied across the
MENA region and particularly popular support for what
the feminist literature from the region has described as
Muslim feminism.We identified different orientations to-
wards women’s rights across the MENA region and ob-
served variations in attitudes across countries over a pe-
riod of widespread social upheaval.
We observed relatively low support for a traditional
secular vision of women’s rights whereby women’s sta-
tus issues are adjudicated according to civil law rather
than Islamic law with only 16% of respondents depend-
ably endorsing views consistentwith keeping religion out
of civil life as it pertains to women. There was relatively
strong agreement across most countries that marriage,
divorce and inheritance rights for women should be adju-
dicated according to Islamic law with the sole exception
of Lebanon, a religiously mixed country with strong secu-
lar legal traditions, and Tunisia, though to a lesser extent.
There was more variation across countries in attitudes
towards requiring the hijab and gender mixed education
at universities.
While respondents largely rejected secular interpre-
tations of women’s rights, we observed relatively high
gender equity norms. Nearly 25% of the sample con-
sistently endorsed equitable gender norms. In particu-
lar, large majorities across all countries disagreed with
the statement that university education is more impor-
tant formen thanwomen. Largemajorities also felt that
women could work outside the home, though it is un-
clear towhat extent this reflected a value judgment (i.e.,
women should be allowed to work outside the home)
versus an empirical reality, particularly for many low-
income households where women must work outside
the home.
We identified relatively prevalent support for what
might be considered a Muslim feminist view of women’s
rightswith nearly a fifth of the sample nearly consistently
supporting gender equitable attitudes but grounded in
an interpretation of Islamic law and custom. The largest
block of the sample, however, fell into neither a purely
secular feminist nor Muslim feminist camp. We did not
explicitly examine the prevalence of what might be con-
sidered a “Muslim fundamentalist” position on women’s
rights, namely those who are not supportive of women’s
rights and that believe in a conservative interpretation of
religious law that would impose constraints on women’s
freedoms. Presumably some individuals fell into this cat-
egory and others had more mixed and inconsistent ideo-
logical views.
Change in Arab-Spring versus non-Arab Spring coun-
tries. We predicted that Arab Spring countries would ex-
perience declining support for secular interpretations of
women’s rights. We suspected that revolutionary senti-
ments that rejected the authoritarian regime would also
reject the persistent support of the West of that regime
at the expense of the “Arab Streets”. We anticipated that
such resentment would manifest itself in the rejection
of Western symbols including secular interpretations of
women’s rights and that we would see growing support
for a Muslim feminist model that grounds gender equal-
ity in an interpretation of Islam. We largely found sup-
port for this thesis, though examining the toplines, more
of the change in attitudes seems to be driven by Egypt
than either Tunisia or Yemen.
We observed overall increases in support for atti-
tudes consistent with this Islamic feminism and declines
in support for secular feminism, between the twoWaves
and in Arab Spring countries compared with non-Arab
Spring countries. On average, non-Arab Spring countries
increased their support for secular feminism and de-
creased their support for Islamic feminism and gender
equality between the two Waves whereas support for
gender equity and Islamic feminism was higher in Arab
Spring countries in Wave 3. These findings indicate a
potential growing acceptance of distinctly non-Western,
religiously-grounded interpretations of women’s rights
in Arab Spring countries. However, with the exception
of Egypt, the changes in point estimates of attitudes
between the two Waves in the Arab Spring countries
(Tunisia and Yemen) were relatively small. Egypt and Al-
geria saw the largest changes in attitudes over the period.
Egypt saw a 10 percentage point decrease in support for
Islamic interpretations of women’s status codes regard-
ing marriage and divorce and inheritance, but also a 10
percentage point increase in support for requiring the hi-
jab and almost a 20 percentage point increase in support
for gender segregated university education, while also
seeing a growth in equitable gender norms.
Egypt’s larger mood shift could be attributable to
the exceptionally turbulent period between 2011 and
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2013 when Egyptians became rapidly disenchanted with
the newly elected Muslim brotherhood government.
Women in Tahrir square in Cairo during the height of
the uprisings reported that “they have never felt as safe
and been treated as respectfully as during the time of
these protests” (Al-Ali, 2012, p. 27). However, the move-
ment that began as a deliberately peaceful “selmiya”was
quickly coopted by a regime that was trying desperately
to hold on to power and resorted to the use of women’s
bodies as tools of warfare. Women’s equal participation
in the uprisings quickly gave way to harassment and vio-
lation of women’s protesters that were widely employed
by the police and their agents. When they assumed the
reigns of power in Egypt, for example, the Muslim Broth-
erhood used women’s position to solidify its control. Its
pre-occupation with women-centered policies such as
lowering the age of legal marriage for women and elim-
ination of parliamentary quotas signaled an attempt to
increase its political legitimacy. The shifts in Egyptian at-
titudes toward a more secular interpretation were po-
tentially facilitated after the fall of the Muslim Brother-
hood by a militarized regime that used secularism as a
weapon to combat the influence of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, while still maintaining a tight grip on the pop-
ulation and an authoritarian rule. Additionally, the pre-
decessor of the Muslim Brotherhood, i.e. the Mubarak
regime, while authoritarian and repressive, took great
pains to bolster its image through passing a number of
women-friendly laws including the law of “Kholh” that
granted women the right to easily initiate and obtain
divorce through the courts.5 The rapid shift from sup-
port of the Muslim Brotherhood to its ousting over this
period could account for the larger attitudinal shifts in
this country.
Attitudes in Yemen and Tunisia remained relatively
stable in spite of the continued political unrest. The low
degree of change in attitudes in Tunisia is somewhat sur-
prising given the growth in the Salafi movement in the
country following the uprisings and the turn the new
government quickly took towards Islamism. Although
claiming to be part of a democratic and moderate move-
ment, the Salafis advocated for polygamy, urf or tempo-
rary, pleasure marriages, lowering the age of marriage,
and female circumcision (Arfaoui, 2014). Proposed re-
forms included separation of the sexes, drawing a rigid
line between the public and private spheres and sending
women back to the “kitchens”. Restricting women’s pub-
lic participation and solidifying gender division of labor
represented their solution against unemployment (Ar-
faoui, 2014). While ultimately the Ennahdha Movement
Party formed a coalition government with the largest
secular party following the implementation of a new
constitution in January 2014, the period of time cap-
tured in this study (2011–2013) represents the height of
the Salafist movement’s reign when there was a grow-
ing support for subjecting women’s status to a greater
scrutiny of an Islamist lens. Yet, Tunisians attitudes to-
wards the interpretation of personal status codes and
gender equality changed little over the period perhaps
because Tunisians were already accustomed to the con-
cept of amoderate interpretation of religious codeswith-
out the need for pure secularism (Arfaoui, 2014; Netter-
strom, 2015).
In Yemen as in other countries swept by the Arab
awakening, women marshaled rallies, slept in protest
camps, went on hunger strikes and covered the unrest as
bloggers and photographers (Finn, 2015). Women were
reported to be leading from the front lines. Yet, attitudes
in Yemen changed little over the period except on the
question of whether the hijab should be required. Sup-
port decreased by over 10% points from 51% to 41% re-
porting that the hijab should be required and an even
greater reduction among men than women. At the same
time, support for Islamist interpretations of status codes
increased slightly. Although women’s status in Yemen is
widely regarded as among the worst in the region with
nearly a quarter of all girls being married before the age
of fifteen, high fertility rates, no penalties for domestic
violence and nearly two-thirds of women being illiter-
ate (Finn, 2015), their attitudes towards gender equal-
ity were not out of step with other countries in the re-
gion. As with Tunisia, this may represent the unfinished
business of the revolution as women’s movements have
been put on hold due to the Houthis, a powerful Is-
lamist rebel group based in northern Yemen, taking over
the government.
Non-Arab Spring countries in the region held similar
though also opposing views on issues pertaining to gen-
der equality andwomen’s status and views have changed
in different direction over time. Given its unique power
structure and political history, Lebanon stood out for its
support of secularism and women’s rights setting it dis-
tinctly apart from other countries in the region. This has
changed little over theArab Spring period. Palestine, Iraq,
Jordan and Sudan experienced little substantial change
in point estimates on attitudes towards women’s sta-
tus and gender equality, perhaps reflecting the fact that
these countries did not experience Arab Spring upris-
ings, with the exception of Jordan where protests in
2011 quickly faded. Notably, in spite of a lack of politi-
cal change in Algeria, there were substantial shifts in atti-
tudes towards status laws and gender equality, including
over a 10% point increase in support for a more Islamic
interpretation of personal status codes, but also a large
increase in the rejection of the hijab and support for gen-
der mixed education. Some have speculated that Algeria
was able to escape the Arab uprising because it already
experienced such an uprising in the early 1990s when
its personal status code underwent significant changes
(Tlemcani, 2016). Although, Algeria did not experience
regime change, the uprising did prompt discussions of re-
form and ultimately an amended constitution in 2016.
5 Interestingly the law relied on Islamic interpretations of the rights of women and contended that the ability of women to initiate and be granted
immediate divorce is embedded in Islamic scriptures and early Muslims’ practices.
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Demographic and other predictors of attitudes to-
wards women’s rights. Overall, a large majority of the
sample preferred a legal system in which laws accord
with Islam (73%) and endorsed a mixed political system
in which religious parties compete openly with secular
political parties (also 73%) over purely secular democ-
racy or complete theocracy. A mixed vision of gover-
nance that accords with Islam while at the same time
allowing democracy and women’s participation in soci-
ety appears to be a dominant motif in the region. In
particular, women were more than twice as likely to
endorse gender equitable norms and Islamic feminism,
but not more likely to endorse secular feminism, sug-
gesting that women in the MENA are largely rejecting
the false dilemma between embracing either religion or
women’s rights.
The finding of gender differences in towards Islamic
feminism accords with recent analyses that show that
women’s groups and female activists that participated in
the Arab Spring uprisings have been largely disappointed
in their lack of gains (and even possible loss of status)
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Retta (2013) found,
for example, that women have lost ground in their po-
litical representation in the post-revolutionary period in
Egypt and Tunisia in spite of being heavily involved in the
uprisings. For instance, the Supreme Military Council in
Egypt revoked the quota of 64 women in parliament that
had been put in place under Mubarak resulting in only
9 of the 508 members of the parliament being female
(Retta, 2013). In Tunisia, the growth of Salafism has been
blamed for a rise in sexual assaults post-revolution (Retta,
2013). These are similar dynamics as have occurred in
previous revolutionary periods. For instance, in the revo-
lution of 1919 in Egypt, the Egyptian feminist movement
joined the nationalist movement for independence and
marched in the streets calling for both the liberation of
women and the liberation of the nation. The national-
ist movement created a temporary space for women’s
demands, but soon closed that space and deemed that
women’s demands should not derail the task of nation
building (Khattab, 2016).
Religiosity had mixed effects on attitudes towards
women’s rights. On the one hand, praying daily and at-
tending Friday prayer were associated with lower sup-
port for secular feminism. Attending Friday prayer reg-
ularly was also associated with lower support for gen-
der equity and Muslim Feminism, but reading the Quran
regularly was associated with higher support for gender
equality. If gender inequitable messages are reinforced
in Friday prayer, this could undermine support for gen-
der equality, whereas being knowledgeable about the
Quran could provide a distinctly Islamic justification for
women’s equality. While overall trends seem to favor
Islamic interpretations of women’s status codes, non-
Muslims stand out for their particularly strong embrace
of secular feminism likely due to their minority status in
the region. Non-Muslims also endorsed more gender eq-
uitable attitudes overall. This finding underscores an on-
going tension—even if Islam can be consistent with gen-
der equality, how can religiously grounded political and
legal systems accommodate people of different faiths if
they eschew secularism?
More educated individuals were more likely to hold
gender equitable attitudes and to endorse Islamic fem-
inism, but not more likely to endorse secular feminism.
Whereas higher education has been linked to greater rad-
icalization (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), greater educa-
tion in this case is associated with a distinctly Islamic in-
terpretation of women’s status codes but that is still con-
sistent with gender equality. Surprisingly though, individ-
uals endorsing Islamic feminism were less likely to hold
anti-Western views suggesting that anti-Western politi-
cal consciousness is not at the root of support for Islamic
authenticity in women’s status. This finding highlights
the distinction between an Islamic fundamentalist inter-
pretation of women’s rights, which may be more closely
bound to anti-Westernism, versus theMuslim feminist in-
terpretation that yearns to ground women’s equality in
religious texts rather than ideology.
A limitation of this analysis is the timing of Wave 2
and 3 directly following the uprisings in Arab Spring coun-
tries. Although this was the necessary context that en-
abled data collection in the first place, it is unclear how
attitudes might have differed prior to the beginning of
the political uprisings. The results are best interpreted
as change during the period of the Arab Spring.
6. Conclusion
Individuals in the MENA, particularly women, are largely
rejecting the false dichotomy between religion and
women’s rights, and feel that Islam is not necessarily an-
tagonistic to women’s rights. All else equal, support for
uniquely Islamic interpretations of policies pertaining to
women’s rights increased over the Arab Spring period
particularly in Arab Spring countries. Relatively high de-
grees of support for gender equality seem to co-exist
with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal
status codes pertaining to women. With large majorities
of individuals endorsing preferences for “mixed” political
and legal systems that allow for a greater incorporation
of religion into public life, gender equality is not being
viewed as inimical to Islam. The region over this time pe-
riod was characterized by relatively low support for sec-
ular interpretation of women’s status.
Although the turn towards women’s rights embed-
ded in Islam breaks down false dichotomies often
assumed between being religious or being feminist,
women’s status appears to remain a site of conflict in
the region. Women and gender remain central to the
construction of social, political and religious hierarchical
structures and political control of communities, whether
it is ethnic, political or religious (Al-Ali, 2012). Our study
confirms that it is not religious doctrines, per se, that
construct and reproduce gender regimes and ideologies,
but the use of specific interpretations of these doctrines
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to create and recreate controllable communities and cit-
izenry by the state and its operatives. Women’s bodies
are still used as an effective site of social construction
and control. Our study also confirms that attitudes about
women’s position are never static but are always fluid,
and shaped by state institutions in authoritarian regimes.
As has occurred far too many times in history, female ac-
tivists in Arab Spring countries have faced a hurdle con-
fronting all revolutionary politics: how to transform the
egalitarian spirit of a brief uprising into a long-lasting rev-
olution for women’s equality.
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Appendix
Table 1. Country sample.
Country Time Sample size Time period of data collection
Algeria Wave 2 1,216 April 15, 2011 May 11, 2011
Wave 3 1,220 March 13, 2013 April 6, 2013
Iraq Wave 2 1,234 February 2, 2011 March 12, 2011
	 Wave 3 1,215 June 6 ,2013 June 29, 2013
Jordan Wave 2 1,188 December 10, 2010 December 16, 2010
	 Wave 3 1,795 December 27, 2012 Jan 6 ,2013
Lebanon Wave 2 1,387 November 24, 2010 December 6, 2010
	 Wave 3 1,200 July 3, 2013 July 26, 2013
Palestine Wave 2 1,200 December 2, 2010 December 5, 2010
	 Wave 3 1,200 December 20,2012 December 29, 2012
Sudan Wave 2 1,538 December 12, 2010 December 30, 2010
	 Wave 3 1,200 April 29 ,2013 May 29, 2013
Egypt Wave 2 1,219 June 16, 2011 July 3, 2011
	 Wave 3 1,196 March 31, 2013 April 7, 2013
Tunisia Wave 2 1,196 September 30, 2011 October 11, 2011
	 Wave 3 1,199 February 3, 2013 February 25, 2013
Yemen Wave 2 1,200 February 1, 2011 February 15, 2011
	 Wave 3 1,200 November 2, 2013 December 4, 2013
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Table 2. Support for strict interpretation of Islamic law, point estimates with confidence intervals.
The gov/parl should enact personal The gov/parl should enact inheritance Women should wear modest clothes Gender-mixed education should be
status laws (marriage, divorce) in laws in accordance with Islamic without needing to wear a hijab. allowed in universities.
accordance with Islamic law law (% agree strongly/agree) (% agree strongly/agree) (% agree strongly, agree)
(% agree strongly/agree)
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Algeria Wave 2 77.5% 78.4% 77.9% 78.1% 78.8% 78.5% 48.5% 50.4% 49.4% 61.0% 61.3% 61.2%
[74.5–80.1] [75.5–81.0] [75.9–79.9] [75.3–80.7] [76.0–81.4] [76.5–80.3] [45.1–51.9] [47.0–53.7] [47.0–51.8] [57.6–64.2] [58.0–64.6] [58.8–63.5]
Wave 3 90.1% 87.0% 88.6% 91.5% 86.9% 89.2% 56.3% 62.9% 59.6% 77.1% 81.4% 79.3%
[87.3–92.4] [83.9–89.5] [86.5–90.3] [88.9–93.6] [83.8–89.4] [87.2–90.9] [52.2–60.4] [58.9–66.8] [56.7–62.5] [73.4–80.4] [78.0–84.4] [76.8–81.5]
Iraq Wave 2 90.0% 89.5% 89.8% 90.6% 90.2% 90.4% 40.8% 40.2% 40.5% 78.4% 75.4% 76.9%
[88.3–91.6] [87.5–91.3] [88.5–91.0] [88.8–92.1] [88.3–91.9] [89.1–91.5] [38.1–43.6] [37.3–43.2] [38.5–42.6] [76.1–80.7] [72.7–77.9] [75.1–78.6]
Wave 3 92.9% 91.4% 92.2% 94.2% 92.9% 93.6% 30.7% 30.9% 30.8% 65.7% 66.2% 65.9%
[90.5–94.8] [88.6–93.6] [90.4–93.7] [92.0–95.8] [90.3–94.9] [92.0–94.9] [26.9–34.8] [27.0–35.0] [28.1–33.7] [61.5–69.7] [61.9–70.2] [63.0–68.8]
Jordan Wave 2 91.0% 86.4% 88.8% 91.19% 86.9% 89.1% 53.2% 57.0% 55.0% 51.0% 60.4% 55.5%
[89.2–92.5] [84.3–88.3] [87.4–90.0] [89.4–92.7] [84.8–88.8] [87.8–90.4] [50.3–56.1] [54.0–59.9] [53.0–57.1] [48.1–53.9] [57.6–63.2] [53.5–57.6]
Wave 3 85.1% 87.9% 86.5% 85.9% 88.6% 87.2% 60.4% 62.1% 61.2% 49.2% 65.3% 57.0%
[81.5–88.1] [84.7–90.5] [84.1–88.5] [82.5–88.7] [85.4–91.1] [84.9–89.2] [55.7–64.8] [58.0–66.1] [58.1–64.3] [44.7–53.7] [61.1–69.2] [53.9–60.1]
Lebanon Wave 2 27.3% 30.3% 28.9% 27.7% 30.1% 29.0% 72.6% 70.7% 71.6% 87.1% 87.9% 87.5%
[25.1–29.6] [27.3–33.4] [27.0–30.8] [25.5–30.1] [27.2–33.2] [27.1–30.9] [70.1–74.9] [67.5–73.7] [69.6–73.5] [85.2–88.8] [85.4–90.0] [86.0–88.9]
Wave 3 35.8% 34.1% 34.9% 34.6% 34.8% 34.7% 76.8% 78.4% 77.6% 94.0% 93.9% 93.9%
[31.7–40.0] [30.1–38.3] [32.0–37.9] [30.6–38.8] [30.8–39.1] [31.9–37.7] [72.9–80.3] [74.6–81.7] [74.9–80.0] [91.5–95.7] [91.6–95.6] [92.3–95.2]
Palestine Wave 2 92.8% 90.6% 91.7% 93.7% 92.7% 93.2% 56.6% 46.6% 51.5% 50.1% 54.7% 52.5%
[91.0–94.3] [88.7–92.2] [90.4–92.8] [92.0–95.1] [91.0–94.1] [92.1–94.2] [53.6–59.5] [43.7–49.6] [49.4–53.6] [47.2–53.1] [51.8–57.7] [50.4–54.6]
Wave 3 90.2% 90.5% 90.4% 92.1% 92.1% 92.1% 49.8% 44.5% 47.2% 52.2% 58.5% 55.3%
[86.8–92.8] [87.0–93.2] [88.0–92.3] [89.0–94.4] [88.9–94.4] [90.0–93.8] [45.2–54.3] [40.0–49.1] [44.0–50.4] [47.6–56.7] [54.0–62.8] [52.1–58.5]
Sudan Wave 2 91.7% 91.7% 91.7% 92.5% 93.0% 92.8% 77.3% 77.2% 77.2% 51.1% 54.3% 52.7%
[90.0–93.1] [90.2–93.0] [90.6–92.7] [90.9–93.9] [91.6–94.2] [91.7–93.7] [75.1–79.3] [74.6–79.6] [75.6–78.8] [48.5–53.8] [51.3–57.4] [50.7–54.7]
Wave 3 87.6% 90.9% 89.2% 87.8% 88.0% 87.9% 79.5% 78.7% 79.1% 48.2% 54.9% 51.5%
[84.3–90.3] [88.1–93.0] [87.1–91.0] [84.5–90.4] [84.8–90.5] [85.7–89.8] [75.6–82.9] [74.7–82.3] [76.3–81.7] [43.7–52.7] [50.3–59.4] [48.3–54.7]
Egypt Wave 2 89.8% 92.4% 91.1% 94.3% 93.6% 94.0% 62.9% 58.8% 60.9% 67.5% 68.3% 67.9%
[88.0–91.4] [90.8–93.8] [89.9–92.2] [92.9–95.4] [92.1–94.9] [93.0–94.8] [60.1–65.7] [56.0–61.6] [58.9–62.9] [64.7–70.2] [65.6–70.9] [65.9–69.8]
Wave 3 87.0% 78.1% 82.5% 87.1% 81.6% 84.3% 52.5% 47.2% 49.8% 51.6% 45.4% 48.5%
[82.6–90.4] [73.1–82.4] [79.2–85.3] [82.6–90.5] [77.0–85.5] [81.2–87.0] [46.8–58.2] [41.9–52.5] [45.9–53.7] [45.9–57.3] [40.2–50.7] [44.6–52.4]
Tunisia Wave 2 60.1% 51.6% 55.8% 83.9% 77.6% 80.7% 81.1% 78.2% 79.6% 85.1% 81.1% 83.1%
[57.3–62.9] [48.8–54.5] [53.8–57.8] [81.8–85.9] [75.1–79.9] [79.1–82.3] [78.8–83.2] [75.7–80.5] [78.0–81.2] [83.0–87.0] [78.7–83.3] [81.5–84.6]
Wave 3 60.7% 55.5% 58.1% 75.1% 77.3% 76.2% 81.4% 83.0% 82.2% 77.4% 82.5% 80.0%
[56.1–65.1] [51.0–60.0] [54.8–61.2] [70.7–79.1] [73.3–80.9] [73.3–78.9] [77.3–84.9] [79.3–86.1] [79.5–84.6] [73.2–81.1] [78.8–85.6] [77.2–82.4]
Yemen Wave 2 89.8% 82.8% 86.2% 88.4% 86.5% 87.4% 53.6% 48.0% 50.7% 50.4% 56.2% 53.4%
[86.6–92.3] [78.3–86.6] [83.5–88.6] [86.1–90.8] [82.6–89.6] [85.2–89.3] [50.3–56.9] [43.4–52.6] [47.8–53.6] [47.0–53.7] [51.4–60.9] [50.5–56.3]
Wave 3 93.5% 89.0% 91.3% 94.0% 91.2% 92.6% 40.3% 41.7% 41.0% 50.8% 54.6% 52.7%
[90.3–95.7] [85.5–91.8] [89.1–93.2] [90.9–96.0] [88.0–93.6] [90.5–94.3] [35.4–45.5] [37.1–46.5] [37.6–44.5] [45.6–56.0] [49.8–59.9] [49.1–56.9]
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Table 3. Support for gender equality, point estimates with confidence intervals.
Variable Women can work outside the home Men are better political leaders than University education is more important for
(% agree strongly/agree) women (% agree strongly/agree) males than females (% agree strongly/agree)
Country Time Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Algeria Wave 2 67.3% 92.0% 79.6% 79.0% 54.1% 66.7% 29.9% 9.0% 19.6%
[64.0–70.4] [90.0–93.6] [77.5–81.4] [76.2–81.6] [50.8–57.5] [64.4–68.9] [26.9–33.2] [7.3–11.1] [17.7–21.5]
Wave 3 81.1% 93.2% 87.1% 75.9% 50.0% 63.0% 6.3% 2.5% 4.4%
[77.6–84.1] [90.8–95.0] [85.0–89.0] [72.1–79.3] [45.9–54.1] [60.1–65.8] [4.6–8.5] [1.5–4.1] [3.3–5.7]
Iraq Wave 2 82.6% 86.5% 84.6% 77.9% 71.7% 74.7% 27.2% 22.4% 24.8%
[80.3–84.6] [84.4–88.4] [83.1–86.0] [75.5–80.1] [68.9–74.3] [72.9–76.5] [24.8–29.8] [20.0–25.0] [23.1–26.6]
Wave 3 75.5% 82.7% 79.0% 83.0% 59.7% 71.7% 27.8% 16.8% 22.4%
[71.7–79.0] [79.1–85.8] [76.4–81.4] [79.7–85.9] [.554,.6392] [68.9–74.4] [24.1–31.9] [13.8–20.2] [20.0–25.1]
Jordan Wave 2 73.4% 90.7% 81.8% 79.3% 70.9% 75.2% 39.9% 26.4% 33.4%
[70.8–76.0] [88.9–92.3] [80.1–83.4] [76.8–81.6] [68.1–73.5] [73.4–77.0] [37.1–42.8] [23.9–29.1] [31.5–35.4]
Wave 3 70.8% 91.5% 80.8% 77.2% 67.1% 72.3% 34.7% 14.8% 25.1%
[66.4–74.8] [88.6–93.7] [78.1–83.3] [73.0–80.9] [63.0–71.0] [69.4–75.1] [30.5–39.3] [12.1–17.9] [22.4–28.0]
Lebanon Wave 2 81.9% 93.5% 87.9% 56.0% 30.6% 42.8% 20.5% 15.4% 17.8%
[79.7–83.9] [91.9–94.8] [86.6–89.1] [53.4–58.6] [27.6–33.7] [40.7–44.9] [18.3–22.8] [12.9–18.1] [16.2–19.6]
Wave 3 85.3% 93.4% 89.5% 48.5% 29.7% 38.9% 13.1% 11.2% 12.1%
[81.9–88.2] [91.0–95.2] [87.4–91.2] [44.2–52.8] [25.9–33.8] [36.0–41.9] [10.4–16.3] [8.8–14.1] [10.3–14.2]
Palestine Wave 2 78.3% 89.7% 84.1% 78.8% 74.5% 76.6% 24.4% 11.4% 17.8%
[75.7–80.7] [87.7–91.4] [82.4–85.6] [76.2–81.2] [71.9–77.0] [74.8–78.4] [22.0–27.0] [9.7–13.3] [16.3–19.4]
Wave 3 77.1% 92.3% 84.6% 76.7% 66.0% 71.4% 25.6% 15.8% 20.7%
[73.1–80.6] [89.5–94.3] [82.2–86.7] [72.5–80.4] [61.6–70.2] [68.4–74.3] [21.8–29.7] [12.8–19.3] [18.3–23.4]
Sudan Wave 2 77.5% 80.5% 79.0% 85.8% 81.9% 83.9% 38.9% 30.8% 34.9%
[75.2–79.6] [77.8–82.9] [77.3–80.6] [83.9–87.5] [79.4–84.1] [82.3–85.3] [36.3–41.5] [28.0–33.7] [33.0–36.9]
Wave 3 75.7% 87.4% 81.5% 79.0% 68.5% 73.8% 36.6% 21.2% 29.0%
[71.6–79.5] [83.8–90.2] [78.8–84.0] [75.2–82.4] [64.0–72.7] [70.8–76.6] [32.4–41.1] [17.7–25.1] [26.1–32.0]
Egypt Wave 2 58.6% 87.3% 72.7% 93.6% 87.9% 90.8% 39.8% 26.9% 33.5%
[55.7–61.4] [85.3–89.1] [70.8–74.5] [92.1–94.9] [85.9–89.7] [89.6–91.9] [37.0–42.7] [24.5–29.5] [31.6–35.4]
Wave 3 77.2% 85.3% 81.3% 70.7% 63.3% 66.9% 21.3% 22.8% 22.1%
[71.8–81.8] [81.0–88.8] [77.9–84.3] [65.3–75.7] [58.0–68.2] [63.2–70.5] [17.1–26.1] [18.5–27.8] [19.0–25.5]
Tunisia Wave 2 83.3% 92.0% 87.7% 81.2% 62.1% 71.6% 29.5% 22.0% 25.7%
[81.1–85.3] [90.2–93.5] [86.3–89.0] [78.9–83.3] [59.3–64.9] [69.7–73.4] [26.9–32.9] [19.7–24.4] [24.0–27.5]
Wave 3 76.7% 89.2% 83.0% 62.0% 45.6% 53.7% 18.6% 11.9% 15.2%
[72.4–80.5] [86.2–91.6] [80.4–85.4] [57.4–66.4] [41.2–50.1] [50.5–56.9] [15.3–22.3] [9.4–15.0] [13.1–17.6]
Yemen Wave 2 70.2% 83.8% 77.1% 78.3% 72.7% 75.5% 39.5% 36.1% 37.8%
[67.2–73.2] [79.9–87.0] [74.7–79.4] [75.5–80.9] [68.7–76.4] [73.0–77.7] [36.2–42.9] [31.4–41.1] [34.9–40.8]
Wave 3 66.8% 78.8% 72.7% 77.5% 63.8% 70.8% 43.4% 34.1% 38.8%
[61.7–71.5] [74.6–82.5] [69.4–75.7] [72.8–81.6] [59.0–68.3] [67.5–73.9] [38.3–48.6] [29.8–38.7] [35.4–42.3]
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Table 4. Descriptive summary of variables included in multivariate analysis.
Variable %
Secular Feminism Strong support 15.62
Moderate support 69.70
Low support 14.68
Equal Gender Norms Consistent support 24.62
Mixed 45.53
No/low support 29.85
Muslim Feminism Low support for secular feminism#High support for gender equality 18.55
Support for Political Secularism Support theocracy 39.61
Support secular democracy 29.77
Support mixed system 73.19
Support for Legal Secularism Support laws that accord with Islam 72.99
Anti-Westernism Agree: Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your country 71.6
Agree US interfere interference in the region justifies armed operations
against the United States everywhere 46.38
Religiosity Pray Daily 74.27
Always attending Friday (or Sun) Prayer 49.13
Always/most of the time read the Quran 64.52
Gender Female 49.84
Age 18–34 49.26
35–54 35.46
55+ 15.28
Urban Rural 35.08
Urban 64.92
Education Primary 46.43
Secondary 34.39
Bachelor+ 19.18
Income Difficulties meeting needs with monthly income 62.86
Monthly income adequate for needs 37.14
Religion No-Muslim 05.6
Married Single 36.72
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Table 5.Multivariate results (slope estimates reported as Odds Ratios).
(1) (2) (3)
Support Support for Muslim
Secular Gender Feminism
Variables Feminism Equality
Gender Norms Consistently low support for gender
equitable norms (ref)
Mixed views on gender equitable norms 1.36***
(1.239–1.490)
Consistent support for equitable 1.57***
gender norms (1.403–1.765)
Secular Feminism Consistent preference for enacting status
codes in accordance with Islam (ref)
Mixed views on status codes 1.44***
(1.311–1.584)
Consistent opposition to enacting 1.76***
status codes in accordance with Islam (1.525–2.027)
Support for Political Support theocracy 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.84***
Secularism (0.683–0.818) (0.699–0.806) (0.756–0.925)
Support secular democracy 2.02*** 0.81*** 0.90**
(1.838–2.211) (0.754–0.872) (0.811–0.997)
Support mixed system (religious 1.09* 1.16*** 1.20***
and secular parties compete) (0.990–1.192) (1.079–1.249) (1.080–1.336)
Legal Secularism Support laws accordance Islam 0.21*** 0.97 1.40***
(0.188–0.234) (0.892–1.055) (1.256–1.570)
Anti-Westernism Agree foreign interference is 1.01 0.94* 0.73***
an obstacle to reform (0.920–1.117) (0.866–1.010) (0.660–0.811)
Agree that the US interferes 1.03 1.04 1.04
too much in the region (0.955–1.118) (0.979–1.108) (0.949–1.132)
Religiosity Pray daily 0.85*** 0.94 0.93
(0.770–0.942) (0.872–1.022) (0.829–1.034)
Always attend Friday prayer 0.80*** 0.87*** 0.84***
(0.731–0.881) (0.812–0.940) (0.755–0.929)
Read the Quran daily 1.01 1.17*** 1.06
(0.920–1.104) (1.092–1.260) (0.956–1.172)
Demographics Female 1.06 2.22*** 2.14***
(0.973–1.148) (2.086–2.373) (1.953–2.346)
Age 18–34 (ref)
35–54 1.04 0.95 0.92*
(0.943–1.136) (0.880–1.019) (0.827–1.016)
55+ 1.09 0.91* 0.87*
(0.960–1.248) (0.821–1.008) (0.747–1.013)
Urban 0.94 1.05 0.94
(0.864–1.030) (0.982–1.129) (0.852–1.035)
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Table 5.Multivariate results (slope estimates reported as Odds Ratios) [cont.].
(1) (2) (3)
Support Support for Muslim
Secular Gender Feminism
Variables Feminism Equality
Education Primary or below
Secondary/technical 1.05 1.39*** 1.26***
(0.957–1.149) (1.291–1.491) (1.136–1.395)
University+ 1.01 1.86*** 1.56***
(0.907–1.135) (1.702–2.030) (1.377–1.760)
Income adequate to meet needs 1.07* 0.97 1.06
(0.989–1.168) (0.910–1.036) (0.971–1.165)
Non-Muslim 9.33*** 1.70*** 0.16***
(7.634–11.40) (1.471–1.969) (0.120–0.224)
Married 0.91* 1.09** 1.13**
(0.832–1.000) (1.015–1.171) (1.021–1.251)
Wave3 0.94 1.46*** 1.44***
(0.865–1.028) (1.361–1.557) (1.311–1.585)
Wave#Arab Spring non-Arab Spring Wave 2 (ref) — — —
Arab Spring Wave 2 0.94 1.46*** 1.44***
(0.865–1.028) (1.361–1.557) (1.311–1.585)
Non Arab Spring Wave 3 1.81*** 0.36*** 0.20***
(1.493–2.190) (0.311–0.425) (0.154–0.269)
Arab Spring Wave 3 0.86*** 1.29*** 1.49***
(0.822–0.905) (1.236–1.336) (1.386–1.593)
Constant cut1 0.04*** 0.66***
(0.034–0.051) (0.560–0.787)
Constant cut2 5.23*** 6.68***
(4.307–6.360) (5.614–7.937)
Constant 0.16***
(0.132–0.197)
Observations 15,608 15,608 15,608
Note: Country fixed effects included but not shown.
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